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Abstract—We propose to use real-valued errors instead of clas-
sical bit flipping intentional errors in the McEliece cryptosystem
based on moderate-density parity-check (MDPC) codes. This
allows to exploit the error correcting capability of these codes to
the utmost, by using soft-decision iterative decoding algorithms
instead of hard-decision bit flipping decoders. However, soft
reliability values resulting from the use of real-valued noise can
also be exploited by attackers. We devise new attack procedures
aimed at this, and compute the relevant work factors and
security levels. We show that, for a fixed security level, these
new systems achieve the shortest public key sizes ever reached,
with a reduction up to 25% with respect to previous proposals.
Index Terms—Compact keys, LDPC codes, McEliece cryp-
tosystem, MDPC codes, real-valued intentional errors.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum computers are able to penetrate hard cryptographic
targets, like cryptosystems based on integer factorization and
discrete logarithms, and code-based cryptosystems are among
the most promising solutions able to resist quantum computer-
based attacks. The McEliece cryptosystem [1] is the best
known code-based asymmetric cryptosystem. In its original
formulation based on Goppa codes, it achieves very fast
encryption and decryption but has very large public keys,
which is a major drawback. According to [2], for achieving
80-bit security with the Goppa code-based cryptosystem we
need 460647-bit public keys. A known way to reduce the
public key size is to replace Goppa codes with other families
of codes, although this may expose the system to security
flaws. A recent line of research has been focused on the use of
quasi-cyclic low-density parity-check (QC-LDPC) and quasi-
cyclic moderate-density parity-check (QC-MDPC) codes in
this context, showing that practical systems with compact keys
can be designed while preserving the system security [3]–[9].
This has been achieved by keeping the same structure of the
original McEliece cryptosystem, in which binary intentional
errors are used during encryption. Therefore, hard-decision de-
coders like the bit flipping iterative decoder [10] are commonly
used in these systems. Message-passing decoders can also
be used, but without the availability of soft reliability values
concerning the ciphertext bits. This makes such decoders work
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in suboptimal conditions, that penalize their performance. In
fact, low-density parity-check (LDPC) codes achieve the best
performance under soft-decision message-passing decoding
when soft reliability information is available [11]. For such
a reason, in this paper we propose to use real-valued noise
samples as an intentional impairment during encryption. This
allows to exploit powerful soft-decision decoders to improve
the error correcting capability of the legitimate receiver. On
the other hand, soft reliability information can be exploited by
attackers as well. Therefore, we develop an updated security
analysis taking this fact into account. Our results show that
this approach allows to achieve public key size reductions up
to 25% with respect to the previously known best solutions.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section II we recall
the original QC-LDPC and QC-MDPC code-based McEliece
cryptosystems, in Section III we introduce a new QC-MDPC
code-based variant exploiting real-valued intentional noise, in
Section IV we assess security of the new system, in Section V
we provide some design examples and in Section VI we draw
some conclusive remarks.
II. QC-LDPC AND QC-MDPC CODE-BASED MCELIECE
CRYPTOSYSTEMS
The original QC-LDPC and QC-MDPC code-based
McEliece cryptosystems exploit codes having rate R = n0−1n0 ,
where n0 is a small integer (e.g., n0 = 2, 3, 4), redundancy r,
length n = n0 · r and dimension k = (n0 − 1) · r. The secret
code is defined through a sparse parity-check matrix H having
the following form [4], [12]:
H = [H0|H1| . . . |Hn0−1] , (1)
where each block Hi is a circulant matrix with size r × r. It
has been recently shown that odd values of r must be chosen
to avoid some possible weaknesses [13]. In most instances
of these systems appeared in previous literature, the matrix
H is regular, although it has been shown in [7] that using
irregular matrices may bring some reduction in the public key
size. Thus, for the sake of comparison, we focus on regular
parity-check matrices, having all the columns with weight dv
and all the rows with weight dc = n0 · dv . When dv is much
smaller than r, we say that the code is an LDPC code. MDPC
codes are a special class of LDPC codes, characterized by
moderately small values of dv (in the order of several tenths).
A. Key generation
The private key is formed by the secret parity-check matrix
H and two other non-singular matrices: a k × k scrambling
matrix S and an n × n transformation matrix Q. The latter
is defined as a sparse matrix with average row and column
weight m ≥ 1 (m is not necessarily an integer, since Q can
be irregular). Both S and Q have quasi-cyclic (QC) form,
that is, they consist of circulant sub-matrices with size r × r.
When QC-MDPC codes are used, Q boils down to an n× n
permutation matrix, and we have m = 1. In this case, as
done in [5], the secret permutation can even be avoided and
Q eliminated (i.e., Q = In×n, the n× n identity matrix).
The public key is obtained as G′ = S−1 ·G ·Q−1, where
G is a systematic generator matrix obtained from H. The role
of S is to make the public generator matrix non-systematic.
However, if we consider a CCA2 secure conversion of the
system [2], G′ can be in systematic form, therefore S can be
eliminated (i.e., S = Ik×k). With G′ in systematic form, and
exploiting its QC structure, the public key size is (n0 − 1) ·
r bits. Such a size is considerably smaller than for classical
Goppa code-based instances with the same security level.
It follows from the public key definition that the public code
admits a parity-check matrix in the form H′ = H ·QT , that
is sparse. Since both H and Q are indeed very sparse, H′ is
very likely the sparsest parity-check matrix of the public code.
For this reason, it can be the target of a key recovery attack,
as we will see in Section IV-C.
B. Encryption
In order to encrypt her message, Alice gets Bob’s public
key G′, divides her message into k-bit vectors and, for each
of them, generates a random intentional error vector e with
weight t. Finally, she encrypts u into x as follows:
x = u ·G′ ⊕ e = c′ ⊕ e, (2)
where ⊕ denotes modulo-2 addition. In fact, in all existing
McEliece cryptosystems, independently of the family of codes
used, the intentional errors are bit flipping errors. This means
that e is a binary vector, and the bits of the codeword c′ which
are at positions corresponding to the support of e are flipped.
C. Decryption
In order to perform decryption, Bob first inverts the secret
transformation (if used):
x′ = x ·Q = u · S−1 ·G⊕ e ·Q = c⊕ e ·Q. (3)
This way, he gets the codeword c belonging to the private
code, corrupted by the error vector e′ = e · Q. Due to the
structure of Q, e′ is a binary vector with weight ≤ t′ =
tm. When m = 1, as in the case of QC-MDPC code-based
systems, Q is a permutation or an identity matrix, hence t′ = t.
Then, Bob performs LDPC decoding to correct all the errors
and easily obtains u ·S−1 owing to systematic encoding. The
message u is then recovered through multiplication by S.
III. EXPLOITING REAL-VALUED INTENTIONAL NOISE
Let us consider a new system in which we use a real-valued
intentional noise vector w in place of the binary intentional
error vector e. In other terms, w is a 1× n vector containing
real-valued noise samples affecting the codeword c′ during
encryption. This way, the ciphertext x is no longer a binary
vector, and becomes a real-valued vector as well.
From the practical standpoint, real numbers are always
represented through finite precision variables. So, we suppose
to use q-bit variables to represent the entries of c′, w and
x. The effects of the finite precision representation of real
numbers can be made negligible by choosing a suitably large
value of q. Obviously, the ciphertext length is increased by
a factor q with respect to the classical systems, and this
may seem an important drawback. However, as we will see
next, exploiting real-valued intentional noise allows to achieve
significant reductions in the public key size, which is the
most important drawback of McEliece-type cryptosystems.
Moreover, the intentional noise vector can also be exploited to
carry information, as first proposed in [14]. This means that
we could encode part of the secret message into the intentional
noise vector, thus reducing the ciphertext expansion. Such a
possibility, however, is left for future investigation.
For the sake of simplicity, in the following we describe
the main procedures of the new system by focusing on the
QC-MDPC code-based variant described in Section II with
CCA2 secure conversion, using S = Ik×k and Q = In×n. The
extension to more general QC-LDPC and QC-MDPC code-
based schemes is also left for future works.
A. Key generation
As in the original system, the private key is formed by an
r×n secret parity-check matrix H in the form (1), from which
a k × n generator matrix G is obtained, in systematic form.
Since S = Ik×k and Q = In×n, the public key is G′ = G,
with size (n0 − 1) · r bits.
B. Encryption
There are several possibilities to extend the encryption map
(2) to the case in which we use a real-valued intentional noise.
Among these, we choose an encryption map that allows to
exploit some LDPC coding theory concepts which are well
known in the literature. In fact, a huge amount of research
works have been devoted to the design and optimization of
LDPC coded transmission schemes with antipodal signals
(e.g., binary pulse amplitude modulation (2-PAM)) over ad-
ditive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channels. Such results
can be reused in the context under consideration if decryption
is performed on a vector which looks like a modulated LDPC
codeword with symbols 1 in place of bits 1 and symbols −1
in place of bits 0, corrupted by AWGN. For this purpose, let
us consider the following encryption map
x = 2 (u ·G′)− 1+w = 2c′ − 1+w, (4)
where 1 is the 1× n all-one vector. The statistical properties
of w can obviously be fixed a priori. We suppose that w is
filled with the samples of a Gaussian variable with mean 0
and standard deviation σ. As we will see in Section IV-B, the
generation of the vector w may require more than one attempt,
since some results need to be discarded for security reasons.
C. Decryption
Since G′ = G, the ciphertext x received by Bob coincides
with a 2-PAM modulated version of a codeword c′ = c
belonging to the private code, corrupted by the intentional
noise vector w, that contains AWGN samples. As in Section
II-C, Bob then performs LDPC decoding to correct all the
errors and recovers u owing to systematic encoding.
Differently from the original system, in this new system
Bob can exploit the optimal performance of message-passing
LDPC decoding algorithms working on the soft reliability
values associated to the received samples. One of the best
algorithms of this type is the sum-product algorithm (SPA)
with log-likelihood ratios (LLRs), that we consider in the
following. In order to perform decoding through the LLR-
SPA, Bob needs to compute the LLR of each codeword bit,
defined as
Λ(xi) = log
[
p(xi|ci = 1)
p(xi|ci = 0)
]
, (5)
where xi is the symbol corresponding to the codeword bit
ci impaired with noise, and p(xi|ci) is the probability density
function (p.d.f.) of xi conditioned on ci. By taking into account
that we have 2-PAM signals impaired with AWGN, through
simple calculations (5) can be rewritten as
Λ(xi) =
2xi
σ2
, (6)
where σ is the AWGN standard deviation.
IV. SECURITY ASSESSMENT
In this section we assess the security of the proposed
cryptosystem by considering both classical attacks and newly
developed attacks aimed at exploiting the real-valued inten-
tional noise. There are two main types of attacks which may
be mounted against these systems: decoding attacks (DAs) and
key recovery attacks (KRAs). While the former are aimed
at decrypting one or more ciphertexts without knowing the
private key, the latter aim at recovering the private key from the
public key. The soft reliability information about the ciphertext
bits that is available in the proposed system may facilitate DAs,
thus helping an attacker to decrypt an intercepted ciphertext.
For this reason, we consider classical DAs, but also devise
new DAs exploiting soft reliability information.
A. Classical decoding attacks
In a DA, the adversary intercepts a ciphertext x and aims at
correcting all the intentional errors added during encryption.
If this succeeds, he can then invert the encoding map and
recover the cleartext. The most dangerous DAs against the
original LDPC and MDPC code-based cryptosystems are those
exploiting information set decoding (ISD) algorithms. These
techniques stem from a family of probabilistic algorithms
aimed at finding low weight codewords in general linear block
codes, first introduced by Leon [15] and Stern [16]. Indeed, it
can be shown that finding the binary error vector e that has
been used in (2) to obtain the ciphertext is very similar to
searching for a low weight codeword in an extended version
of the public code.
These algorithms have known great advances in recent years
[17]–[20]. Today, one of the best known algorithms to search
for low weight codewords in a linear block code is that
introduced in [20]. Its work factor in the finite code length
regime has been computed in closed form in [5, Appendix
B]. For a code with length n and dimension k in which
a (single) codeword with weight w is searched, we define
this quantity as WFBJMM(n, k, w), representing the number
of elementary operations which are needed to successfully
complete the algorithm execution, on average.
The QC nature of the codes we consider facilitates such
a task, since each block-wise cyclically shifted version of a
ciphertext is still a valid ciphertext. Therefore, an attacker
could consider all the QC shifts of an intercepted ciphertext,
and search for one among as many shifted versions of the error
vector. For codes in the form (1), the number of possible QC
shifts of a ciphertext is r, and the corresponding advantage
in terms of the algorithm complexity is in the order of
√
r
[21]. Therefore, the work factor of decoding attacks against
the original systems can be computed as
WF
(1)
DA(t) =
1√
r
WFBJMM(n, k, t), (7)
where t is the weight of the vector e used during encryption.
An attack of this kind can also be mounted against the new
cryptosystem by applying hard-decision, discarding the soft
reliability information and trying to correct the bit errors
induced by the intentional noise.
B. Soft reliability information-aided decoding attacks
According to the proposed approach, both Bob and Eve may
take advantage of the soft reliability information about each
bit of any ciphertext. This facilitates Bob, which may exploit
powerful iterative soft-decision decoding algorithms for LDPC
and MDPC codes. However, the same information can also be
exploited by Eve to mount a decoding attack.
A first attempt that Eve can make is to also use an iterative
soft-decision decoding algorithm to decode the public code.
The performance of these decoders is actually difficult to
predict from a theoretical standpoint. However, an ultimate
bound on their performance can be computed through the
density evolution technique [11]. This provides the maximum
noise level which can be compensated under the hypothesis
of infinite length codes with absence of closed loops in their
associated graphs. Obviously, when practical, finite length
codes with cycles in their graphs are used, the maximum
noise level which still allows error correction is bounded away
from the density evolution threshold. However, the latter is
still useful in our case, since it represents an ultimate limit.
Therefore, if the intentional noise level used during encryption
is above the density evolution threshold, we are sure that error
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Fig. 1. Gaussian noise threshold values (σt) found through density evolution
for regular codes with parity-check matrix column weight dv and rate R =
1/2, 2/3, 3/4.
correction cannot be performed through iterative soft-decision
algorithms working on the public code, independently of the
code length. The density evolution threshold decreases as long
as the parity-check matrix column weight increases, as shown
in Fig. 1. This is the reason why these decoding algorithms
are very likely inefficient on the public code, which has a
dense parity-check matrix, unless a key recovery attack is first
successfully accomplished.
However, even when the intentional noise level is above
the density evolution threshold and iterative soft-decision
decoding algorithms are ineffective, an attacker could still
exploit the soft reliability information to facilitate classical
DAs. For this purpose, the attacker could proceed as follows:
1) sort the ciphertext bits in decreasing reliability (i.e.,
|Λ(xi)|) order,
2) select the tf least reliable ciphertext bits, suppose that
they are in error and flip them,
3) use ISD to correct the residual bit errors.
The work factor of such an attack procedure can be com-
puted as follows (mathematical derivations are omitted for
the sake of brevity). The probability that the ciphertext bit
at position i in the ordered list is in error due to an intentional
Gaussian noise with mean 0 and standard deviation σ can be
computed as
Pe,i = n
(
n− 1
i− 1
)∫ +∞
0
g−1,σ(x) [P (x)]
i−1 [1− P (x)]n−i dx,
(8)
where g−1,σ(x) = 1σ√2pi e
− (x+1)
2
2σ2 is the p.d.f. of a Gaussian
variable with mean −1 and standard deviation σ and
P (x) = 1− 1
2
[
erfc
(
−x− 1
σ
√
2
)
− erfc
(
x+ 1
σ
√
2
)]
. (9)
The probability that all the tf bits flipped by the attacker are
indeed in error can then be computed as
Pf =
tf−1∏
i=0
Pe,n−i. (10)
The overall work factor of the decoding attack aided by the
soft reliability information can be obtained as
WF
(2)
DA =
1√
r
WFBJMM(n, k, t
∗ − tf )
Pf
, (11)
where t∗ is the total number of bit errors on the ciphertext
induced by the intentional Gaussian noise. Obviously, an
attacker is free to choose the value of tf that minimizes the
work factor expressed by (11).
If we use a purely random noise, the value of t∗ follows a
binomial distribution with mean tˆ = n2 erfc
(
1
σ
√
2
)
. Therefore,
some ciphertexts may experience small values of t∗, and hence
may be more vulnerable to attacks of this type. To avoid
this risk, we can require Alice to discard those vectors w
corresponding to values of t∗ falling below some threshold
t, and compute the work factor considering the worst case in
which t∗ = t. We have verified through numerical simulations
that a simple and effective choice is to impose that t∗ ≥ t = tˆ.
This does not require Alice to perform too many attempts to
generate the vector w (half of them are successful on average)
while allowing to achieve good security levels with compact
keys.
C. Key recovery attacks
KRAs are aimed at recovering the private key from the
public key. Even when the private key is not exactly recovered,
the attack may be successful by finding an alternative private
key which is still useful for an attacker to perform decoding.
An efficient way to recover a sparse parity-check matrix for
the public code (H′) is to search for its rows in the dual of the
public code. When H′ is successfully recovered, it can then be
used by an attacker to recover H by exploiting its sparsity, or
to perform LDPC decoding and correct the intentional errors.
In general, the matrix H′ has column weight d′v = m · dv
(that is, d′v = dv for the QC-MDPC code-based system we
consider) and row weight d′c = n0 · d′v. Therefore, d′v must be
large enough to make finding the rows of H′ in the dual of
the public code computationally infeasible for an attacker.
Since the codes are QC with parity-check matrices in the
form (1), all the rows of H′ are obtained as the QC shifts of
one of them. This reduces the attack complexity by a factor
equal to the number of rows of H′, i.e., r. Therefore, the work
factor of a KRA can be computed as
WFKRA =
1
r
WFBJMM(n, r, d
′
c). (12)
V. EXAMPLES
Let us focus on 80-bit security. The McEliece cryptosystem
with the shortest public key size known in the literature is
reported in [5], and achieves 4801-bit public keys (with CCA2-
security conversion) using codes with length n = 9602, rate
1/2 and a decoding failure rate (DFR) in the order of 10−7 or
less. Such a system uses t = 84 binary intentional errors and
QC-MDPC codes with public and private parity-check matrix
column weight d′v = dv = 45.
Let us consider a similar system with the same value of
d′v = dv, and suppose that the same number of bit errors are
induced by an intentional Gaussian noise, i.e., t = tˆ = 84.
If we reduce the code length to n = 7202, we obtain
σ = 1√
2erfc−1(2tˆ/n)
= 0.44091. We have verified through
numerical simulations that, for these values of n and σ, the
LLR-SPA decoder is still able to compensate the intentional
noise with a DFR in the order of 10−7.
Concerning DAs and KRAs, their work factors are
WF
(2)
DA = 2
80.49 (minimum for tf = 0) and WFKRA =
280.17, respectively. According to Fig. 1, the density evolution
threshold for codes with rate 1/2 falls below 0.4 for parity-
check matrix column weights > 223. Unless a KRA is
performed, the parity-check matrices of the public code which
are available to an attacker are dense, with column weight
in the order of one thousand or more. Hence, iterative soft-
decision decoders cannot be used to cancel the intentional
noise. Therefore, this system is able to achieve 80-bit security
with 3601-bit public keys, that is, about 25% less than the best
known solution.
If we focus on 128-bit security, the solution provided in
[5] that achieves the smallest public key is that using codes
with rate 1/2, n = 19714, d′v = dv = 71 and t = 134
intentional errors. Considering n = 15770 and an intentional
Gaussian noise with t = tˆ = 134 yields σ = 0.41897, that is
still above the density evolution threshold for dense matrices.
We have verified through simulations that a QC-MDPC code
with rate 1/2, n = 15770 and dv = 71 is able to compensate
such a noise level under LLR-SPA decoding, with a DFR in
the order of 10−7. In this case, the attack work factors are
WF
(2)
DA = 2
129.06 (minimum for tf = 0) and WFKRA =
2130.24. Therefore, 128-bit security can be achieved with 7885-
bit public keys, that is, about 20% less than the best known
solution (reported in [5] and requiring 9857-bit public keys).
In both these cases, the smallest work factors are found
when no bits are flipped by the attacker based on their
reliabilities (i.e., tf = 0). However, this situation changes
when the code rate is larger than 1/2, since the advantage an
attacker gains by exploiting flipped bits becomes significant.
For example, if we consider a code with n = 10779 and rate
2/3, with t = tˆ = 53 (that implies σ = 0.38736) and tf = 0,
we obtain WF (2)DA = 280.84. Instead, if the attacker tries to
flip the least reliable bits before performing ISD, the attack
work factor can be reduced to WF (2)DA = 275.53 (mininum for
tf = 22) and the value of t must be consequently increased
in order to achieve 80-bit security.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have verified that using real-valued intentional noise
during encryption can be highly beneficial in order to achieve
QC-MDPC code-based cryptosystems with compact keys. Our
results show that public key size reductions up to 25% with
respect to the best known solutions can be obtained. Future
investigations will involve the chance to jointly use binary
and real-valued intentional errors, as well as real-valued noise
samples conveying part of the secret message.
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